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COMMON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE CASE-LAW 
OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
If the description of fundamental rights as the body of rights and freedoms 
protected by the Constitutions is undoubtedly not entirely satisfactory in compara- 
tive law, that description is quite inappropriate in the Community legał order, 
which is based not on a Constitution but on international treaties. Although the 
case-law of the Court of Justice has evolved along constitutional lines at the same 
time as the Community legał order has gone through a process of constitutionalisa- 
tion1 -  it is a „Community based on the rule of law” according to the judgement of 
23 April 19862 -  and although the development of those fundamental rights has 
followed the same direction, the specific naturę of the Community has produced 
particular effects from the outset. Since the objectives and activities of the Com­
munity were economic, the Treaties emphasised the economic freedoms, and more 
incidentally the social freedoms, of the nationals of Members States in order to 
succeed in establishing a vast market based on the free movement of goods, per- 
sons (both natural and legał) and the means of production. The Treaties therefore 
mention rights which are very similar to fundamental rights but which hinge on the 
principle prohibiting discrimination on the ground of nationality. Moreover, while 
the mixed character of the Community legał order leads it to borrow from the tech- 
niques (and rules) of international law and those of domestic law,it is by naturę an 
autonomous legał order.
Initially the separation of the Community legał order from the aspect of 
both national legał orders and the international legał order meant that the necessity 
for a Community definition and guarantee of fundamental rights was forgotten. 
Several means of establishing fundamental rights were available to the Communi­
ty: by revising the Treaties (which was limited to the provisions of the Preamble to
1 R. K o v a r , La conlribulion de la Cour de Justice a 1’ediftcation de l'ordre juridique commtwautaire. 
Recueildes Courts de l ‘Academie de Droit Europeen, 1993. vol. IV-1, p. 25.
- Case 294/83, Partie ecologisle „Les Verts” v European Parliament (1986| ECR 1339.
the Single Act and to Article F (2) of the Treaty on European Union), but there was 
no catologue of fundamental rights and the Community institutions choose to resort 
to Common Declarations or Resolutions3; by acceding to international treaties 
which were conceived for States (including the European Convention on Humań 
Rights); or by means of judicial decisions, often described as the „judge-made” 
method. It is the last method that has consistently prevailed.
I. Individual fundam ental rights, a category of generał principles in Commu­
nity Law
The judicial thinking that led to the insertion of individual fundamental ri­
ghts in the generał principles of Community law has its origins in the weakness of 
the Treaty provisions, which contrasts with the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States: fundamental rights (FGR) constitutionally guaranted rights (Au­
stria), human rights (Finland) or rights of freedom (Denmark and Italy). These 
rights are inscribed in the constitutional provisions, where they form a catalogue, or 
laid down in the form of directly applicable guaranties. Although the French Con- 
stitution of 1958 lays down only a few fundamental rights, it refers to the Declara- 
tion of 1798 and the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946. On which the Constitu­
tional Council has conferred constitutional values4. The situation in England is 
unusual, sińce there is no written Constitution, but the absence of such a Constitu­
tion is compensated by the existence of ancient provisions and by case law. In 
France the Constitutional Council has used its power of interpretation to confer an 
extensive and concrete content on written measures5.
The Treaties establishing the Communities did not contain an exhaustive 
list of fundamental rights -  which led to subseąuent demands, that a list be drawn 
up, or that the Communities should accede to the European Convention on Human 
Rights6 -  for two essential reasons which were considered complementary at the 
time when the Communities were established. The first is the technical and econo- 
mic character conferred on the Communities, especially the ECSC; and the second 
is the perception of a division of work in Europę following the implementation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights in application of Article 3 of the Sta- 
tute of the Council of Europę7. Certain provisions of the Treaties, in application of 
the concept of common market, lay down generał principles which are very close 
to fundamental rights. That is so of the rules on freedom of movement for workers
5 The most complete o f these is the Declaration o f Fundamental Rights and Freedoms adopted by the Eu­
ropean Parliament on 12 April 1989 (OJ 1989 C 120).
4 The most complete is the Declaration o f Fundamental Rights and Freedoms adopted by the European 
Parlament on 12 August 1989 (OJ 1989 C 120).
5 CF. C. G re w e  and H. R u iz  F a b r i ,  Droils constitutionnels europeena, PUF. 1995, in particular p. 155
et seq.
6 Cf. Infra.
7 Namely the acceptance o f the „principles o f the rule o f law and the enjoyment by all persons within the 
jurisdiction o f  the member States o f human rigts and fundamental freedoms”.
(Article 48), freedom of establishment and freedom to provide servive (Articles 52 
and 59) and the prohibition on grounds of nationality (Article 6 as amended by the 
Treaty on European Union) and where pay is concemed, sex (Article 119). Ho- 
wever, the degree to which power was transferred to the Community institutions 
made it necessary to ensure that the fundamental rights were guaranteed at a level 
equivalent to that attained by the Member States. In the absence of a specific revi- 
sion of the Treaties, which would have had too evident a constitutional meaning -  
and would therefore have provoked very strong reluctance -  the Court of Justice 
tumed to a systematic construction.
II. Extention by the C ourt of the generał principles of law
1. The generał principles on the Community legał order are the product of the met- 
hods of interpretation used by the Court and in particular the principle of practical 
effect (effect utile) or purpose (or teleological) interpretation which dominates the 
Community construction and which is not inconsistent (apart from the frequency 
with which the extent to which it is used) with the traditions of international law. 
Initially a subsidiary source of the law, the generał principles have been interpreted 
in such a way that they have been added to the original law without acquiring a 
higher value than written law, by the effect of the generał clause on the competence 
of Court of Justice in Article 164 of the EEC Treaty: „The Court of Justice shall 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed”. 
In the Opinion 1/91 on the compatibility of the (first) draft agreement on the Euro­
pean Economic Area, the Court reinforced the authority which it derives from Ar­
ticle 164 by rejecting a draft agreement which might have resulted in the Court of 
European Economic Area interpreting the provisions of the agreement in a way 
which was incompatible with the internal case-law of the Community8.
The generał principles of international law occupy only a limited place, 
sińce they might contradict the structure of the Community legał order, such as the 
principle of reciprocity of obligations, and member States cannot take the law into 
their own hands9. The principles peculiar to the Community legał system are con- 
sequence of the institutional naturę of the Community (the principle of institutional 
equilibrium) or from the functions conferred on it (and in this case they are some- 
times an extrapolation of rules in written law, whether primary law or secondary 
law (for example: the principle of Community preference was derived from the 
agricultural policy)10.
Certain generał principles are by naturę „axiomatic” or „inherent in any or- 
ganised legał system” 11, such as the principle of lawfulness, respect for the rights
8 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR 1-6079. The Court further observed that an ad hoc revision o f the Treaty 
would not resolve the issue.
9 Case 80 and 91/63 EEC Commissions v Luxembourg and Belgium [1964] ECR 625.
10 Case 5/67 W. beus GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt Munchen [1968] ECR 81.
11J. B o u 1 o u i s, Grands arrets de la CJCE, vol. I, Fifth Edition, p. 80.
of the defence or the principles that guarantee the certainty of legał relations. La- 
stly, the Court of Justice has identified a number of principles common to the laws 
of the member states, a proces which initially remains consistent with the interna- 
tional tradition in Article 38 of the Statuę of the International Court of Justice (the 
„generał principles of law recognised by civilised nations”) and by reference to 
Article 215 (2)12 on non-contractual liability. This reference is useful but rather 
indirect, sińce the „generał principles common to the laws of the member States” 
mentioned in Article 215 refer primarily to the principles governing the liability of 
the public powers in the various States and not to generał principles of law słricło 
sensu and sińce, furthermore, the court was led to derive an autonomus system of 
liability when it found no real convergence. The Court has accepted a number of 
principles: the eąuality of those subjects to the law, the principle of the right to a 
court, which has had numerous effects, the principle of the hierarchy of rules, un- 
due enrichment, the principles concerning the withdrawal of measures combined 
with legał certainty.
This generał construction calls for two remarks to which I shall return be- 
low. First, it is apparent, even by means of a discursive survey, that generał princi­
ples and fundamental rights are sometimes closely interlinked where the beneficia- 
ry is the person, even though the Member States are also concemed by the same 
principle: in this sense the extension of generał principles to fundamental rights by 
the case-law was implicit from the outset. This interlinking weakens any attempt at 
a clear-cut classification. The second observation is that the case-law theory of 
generał principles already contained the problematic of fundamental rights as re- 
gard the reąuirement of a common character, sińce the Court had shown real flexi- 
bility as regards generał principles. Moreover, it may be found that one and the 
same principle may have simultaneously a generał (axiomatic) character, a specifi- 
cally institutional character and a common (or partially common) character in the 
laws of the Member States.
2. In ECSC cases the Court refused to examine the validity of Community measu­
res in the light of the fundamental rights recognised by the German Constituion on 
the ground that it did not have power to ensure observance of rules of domestic 
law, even constitutional law13. The Court adopted this position which was consi­
stent with the respective autonomy of the Community and domestic legał orders, in 
order to ensure that Community law was not subordinated to the constitutional 
provisions of the Member States. The risk of that happening refers to the theory of 
structural congruence, which formed the basis of a number of decisions of the 
German courts. Advocate General Lagrange had already suggested that the Court 
should agree to examine the validity of Community measures in the light of the 
generał principles common to the laws of the Member States.
12 „...the Community shall, in accordance with the generał principles common to the laws of the Member 
States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants...” .
13 Case 1/58 Friedrich Stork & Co v High Authority [19601 ECR 225 and cases 30-38 and 40/59 President 
Ruhrkohlen-Yerkaufsgesellschsft mbH v High Authority [1960] ECR 423.
The establishment of the case-law on direct effect and the primacy of 
Community law led to a change of viewpoint, sińce Treaty law „could not be over- 
ridden by domestic legał provisions” (Case 6/65 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585) 
and it was therefore appropriate to ensure that fundamental rights enjoyed the same 
level of protection in the Community legał order and under the laws of the Member 
States. The autonomy of the Community and domestic legał orders was preserved 
by reasoning which contains a genuine invocation in the rules and the sources of 
law. In Stauder14 the Court had indicated that: „the provision at issue contains 
nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental rights enshrined in the generał 
principles of Community law and protected by the Court”.
The grounds of the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft judgement15, in 
which the Court gave a preliminary ruling on a question referred by a Frankfurt 
Court, are more explicit: „recourse to the legał rules or concepts of national law in 
order to judge the validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Commu­
nity would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community 
law. The validity of such measures can only be judged in the light of Community 
law. In fact, the law stemming from the Treaty, an independence source of law, 
cannot because of its very naturę be overridden by rules of national law, however 
framed, without being deproved of its character as Community law and without the 
legał basis of the Community itself being called in ąuestion. Therefore the validity 
of a Community measure of its effect within a member State cannot be affected by 
allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the 
constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure; 
However, an examination should be made as to whether or not any analogous gu- 
arantee inherent in Community law has been disregarded. In fact, respect for fun­
damental rights forms an integral part of the generał principles of law protected by 
the Court of Justice”.
The Court stated that it was guided by the constitutional traditons common 
to the member States „within the framework of the structure and objectives of the 
Community”: the process involved was one of the selecton and transposition. The 
Court subseąuently widened that judicial construction to international agreements 
concluded by the member States: „The international treaties on the protection of 
human rights in which the Member States have cooperated or to which they have 
adhered can also supply indications which may taken into account within the fra­
mework of Community law” 16.
3. The mechanism of transposition was not immediately accepted by the German 
Court. In a judgement of 29 May 1974 the Court had held that the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution prevailed over inconsistent measures 
of secondary Community law. The Constitutional Court’s position expressed its
14Case 29/69 Stauer v Ulm [1969] ECR 419.
15 Case 11/70 Internatonale Handelsgcsellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fUr Getreide und Fut- 
termittel [1970] ECR 1125.
16 Case 4/73 J. N o Id, Kohlen- unii Bmistoffgrosshandlung v EC Commission, [1974] ECR 491. The 
judgment was delivered in the context o f the accession of France to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Court subseąuently confirmed the reference to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
mistrust of the extent to which fundamental rights were protected in the Comunity 
system, given the institutional deficiencied which it indicated: it therefore reserved 
the right to examine the conformity of secondary Community law with the Consti­
tution after it had referred the matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ru- 
ling. That restrictive position was abandoned on 22 October 1986, after the Single 
Act had conferred wider powers on the European Parliament and, according to the 
Federal Constitutional Court, as long as the Court of Justice ensures that funda­
mental rights are given a level of protection comparable to that which they enjoy 
under the Basic Law.
The reasoning by the German Constitutional Court recognises the Commu­
nity theory elaborated by the Court Justice. That theory led to Article F(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union, which is worded as follows: „The Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 
1950 and as they result from the constitutional principles common to the Member 
States, as generał principles of Community Law”. It should be pointed out that this 
provision, which is purely declaratory, adds nothing to the existing system accor­
ding to which fundamental rights are recognised and guaranteed. Furthermore, 
Article F(2) is aimed at all the parties to the Treaty, including those not covered by 
the Court’sjurisdiction (Titles V and VI on intergovernmental cooperation).
III. The proxim ity of generał principles and individual fundam ental rights
The ąuestion may be put as follows: may the confirmation of a generał 
principle lead, depending on the person of the beneficiary, to the gradual recogni- 
tion of a new individual rights?
1. The inclusion of the principle of proportionality in the text of the Treaty on Eu­
ropean Union17 is the consequence of a judicial evolution which has tended to wi- 
den its application to all areas of Community law without exception. When the 
Treaties were originally drawn up such a generał provision could not be included 
because the Court of Justice had not yet developed the theory of the generał princi­
ples of law18. It is still apparent that those who drafted the Treaty on European
17 Article 3b, third paragraph: „Any acton by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve objectives o f  this Treaty” .
18 The Treaty contained special provisions which helped the Court to elaborate a generał principle of law: 
-Article 36 on (national) exception to the free movement o f goods, which the Court subsequently esta-
blished must be necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued;
-Article 40 (3), which provides that the common organization o f  agricultural markets is to be limited to 
pursuit o f  the objectives o f the common agricultural policy (set out in Article 39);
-Article 85(3) lays down a negative condition for declatations that paragraph 1 is inapplicable: the agre- 
ement, decision o r concerned practice (or category thereof) concerned must „not... impose on the undertakings 
concem ed restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment o f these objectives” (positive conditions);
-Article 115, which provides that priority to be given to measures „which cause the least disturbance to... 
the common market” ;
-Article 226 lays down a similar condition in respect of protective measures.
Union took care not to place the principle of proportionality on the same level as 
the principle of subsidiarity, but that they none the less emphasised the link betwe- 
en the two principles, which are complementary as regards limiting the powers of 
the Community.
When viewed from the aspect of the common heritage the principle of pro­
portionality raises two distinct but complementary problems: is it a generał princi­
ple common to the laws of Member States and does it lead to the creation of fun­
damental rights? The first question illustrates the ambiguities of any attempt to 
categorise generał principles on the basis of their origins or the sources which in- 
spired them. Jean Boulois, after amphasising that a principle established as „com­
mon” may be maintained as a generał principle of law or that a principle which is 
supposed to be inferred from the naturę of the Community may lack specificity and 
have its origins in various legał orders, chooses to make of such a principle a gene­
rał principle inferred from the naturę of the Community (the concept of a common 
market)19. Other writers prefer to see a principle inferred from the laws of the 
member States, even though the majority emphesise the German origin of the prin­
ciple of proportionality. The principle of proportionality is not written but being 
derived from the first twenty articles of the Basic Law, in particular Articles 2 and
12, it was established by the Constitutional Court as a generał principle of consti­
tutional value: in fact it is regarded by writers as one of the esential components of 
a State governed by law and it is therefore binding on both the executive authorities 
and the legislative authorities. As Mr Akehurst observes20, one of the main reasons 
for its inclusion in the Community legał order is the extend to which the German 
courts have made use of the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 
177 EEC.
Although the principle of proportionality was largely inspired by German 
law, that was not the only source of inspiration. By its naturę the principle of pro­
portionality includes a method of judicial control which reduces the share of di- 
scretion of the decision-making authority and may go as far as to introduce a num­
ber of assessments which are very close to eąuality, a new approach which should 
normally lead the judge to exercise self-restraint. The dimension of the judicial 
power is essential. It is also possible to suggest that the principle is present in the 
various national legał orders while the fact that the principle is established at 
Community level may encourage its adoption in the national legał orders21. The 
evaluation by the English courts of whether conduct is reasonable (the „rule of 
reasonableness”) is inspired by proportionality. Under the influence of Germany
These references show the plural origins o f the same generał principle o f  law which may be inferred from 
the rules laid down in the Treaty and at the same time for a fuller judicial construction.
19 J. B o u lo u is ,  Principles generawc, Repertoire communautaire, Dalloz, 16 and 62 in particular. Well- 
founded though it may be, this classification is rather inconsistent with the application od proportionality to certain 
aspects o f stuff disputes. For a case conceming the dismissal o f stuff, see case 18/63 Estelle Schmitz v Europaen 
Economic Community [1964] ECR 163.
20 In the application o f generał principles o f law by the Court o f Justice o f  the European Communities, 
„Yearbook of Public International Law” 1982, p. 39.
21 f. infra II. C.
(or even, in anticipation, of the Community), the Spanish Constitutional Court de- 
cided on 15 October 1982 that proportionality was a generał principle of law. In 
French law the genesis of the principle of proportionality is inherent in the deci- 
sions of the administrative courts and the Constitutional Council: measures of ad- 
ministrative procedure (sińce 1933), the so-called „cost-benefit” balance (espe- 
cially sińce 1971 )22, especially where private property or interests are adversely 
affected, control of manifest error of appreciation where the administration tradi- 
tionallly had unfettered power to asses the facts. Sensitive sectors which were ori- 
ginally immune to control of that type (the immigration authorities, disciplinary 
proceedings, etc.) gradually came within the jurisdiction of the administrative co­
urts. Under the influence of administrative case-law, the Constitutional Coucil 
extended its control to manifest error, beginning with its decision on the nationali- 
sation laws23 and the laws on New Caledonia24.
Without returning at this point to the debate on the extent to which generał 
principles of law must be common, the principle of proportionality may be regar- 
ded as being inferred from the national laws concerned.
The second question, which concems the extent to which proportionality is 
established in common fundamental rights, calls for ąualified remarks. In legał 
writing, proportionality is not a generał rule included among the classifications or 
lists of fundamental rights, which do not give an accurate (and up-to-date) account 
of what C. Grewe and H. Ruiz cali „the gradual development of fundamental ri­
ghts”25. None the less, the principle of proportionality constitutes a right of defence 
of the individual as against the public powers, the State or the institutions of the 
Community. In the judgment in which the theory of fundamental rights was first 
stated, Internationale Handesgesellschaft2(>, the Court was faced with the fact that 
the plaintiff undertaking relied before the German courts on both the rights of pro­
perty and proportionality, on the ground that the non-recoverability of the deposit 
payable in agricultural transactions constituted a disproportionate violation of the 
right of property which was not justified by the objectives of the agricultural regu- 
lations. In the same way the principle has been extended to penalties that the insti­
tutions may apply to economic transactions and therefore to undertakings and in- 
dividuals27.
The principle of proportionality plays a part in reconciling cotradictory 
rights in the sphere of fundamental rights. It is also going through new deve- 
lopments in connection with relations between private persons in the domestic 
legał orders as a result of indirect effect, i.e. of an interpretation of the generał rules
-2 Counseil d ’Etat 28 May 1971, Societe Ville nouvelle-Est, Rec. 409.
23 Decision no. 81-132 of January 1982.
24 Decision no. 85-196 of 8 August 1985.
25 In Droits cnstitutionnels europeens, P.U.F. 1995, p. 154 et seq.
26Cited above.
27 The Court o f  Justice established an express link between the right o f  ownership and proportionality in 
Hauer concerning a Community regulation on the common market in wine and wine products which prohibited 
owners from planting additional vines (Case 44/79) Hauer v Land Rhcinland-Pfalz (1979] ECR 3727.
of private law28. However, the ambivalence of the principle, illustrated by its inclu- 
sion in the Treaty on European Union, is elear: it serves to protect both the rights of 
the States -  as a structural principle -  and, as it has been pointed out, the funda­
mental rights of the person.
2. The principle of the right to be heard (droits de la defense), was directly esta­
blished in the system applicable in contentious proceedings before the Court had 
declared that it was inspired by the rules of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in particular Article 6 par. 3, which covers 
particular applications of the generał principle of the right to a fair hearing29. It is 
in the field of non-contentious procedure that the Court has laid down the principle 
for the benefit of the States (system for control of aids), Community servants30 and 
undertaking where the outeome of the procedure may involve a penalty or an act 
which adversely affects the person concerned.
In Hoffmann-La-Roche, a case concerning the powers and obligations of 
the Commission in Connection with the abuse of a dominant position, the Court 
pointed out that: „Observance of the right to be heard is in all proceedings in which 
sanctions, in particular fines or penality payment, may be imposed a fundamental 
principle of Community law which must be respected even if the proceedings in 
question are administrative proceedings”31. Is the right to be heard a fundamental 
right common to the Member States? The constitutional laws of the States gene- 
rally establish concepts which are comparable but more flexible: equal treatment in 
proceedings, procedual guarantees, the audi alteram partem  rule. Legał writers in 
Germany take view that this right has constitutional value because it is presumed to 
be contained in the fundamental principle of human dignity laid down in Article 1 
of the Basic Law. In France the Constitutional Council promoted the principle of 
the right to be heard to the rank of a fundamental principle recognised by the laws 
of the Republic in criminal matters in a decision delivered on 2 December 1972 
(Law on the development of prevention of accidents at work)32 and in a decision of
2 July 1977 concerning non-contenious proceedings (deducations from officials’ 
salaries)33.
Furthermore, the case-law of the organs of the European Convention has 
had an indirect influence on the case-law of the Court of Justice, even though the
28 On this point, see W. V an  G e rv e n , Principle de proportionnalite, abus de droits et droits fonda- 
mentawc, „Journal des Tribunaux” 1992 (1 1 April), pp. 305-309. On the effects o f fundamental rights in private 
relationships, reference should be made to C. G re w e  and R u i /  F a b r i ,  op. cii., p. 181 et seq.
29 Although the Strasbourg institutions have given it a wide interpretation, Article 6 par. 1 o f the Conven- 
tion makes provisions for „civil rights and obligations” and „ any criminal charge” : cf. F. S u d re , Droit Interna­
tional et europeen des 1'homme P.U.F., Second Edition, p. 202.
30 Case 35/67 Van Eick v EC Commission [1968] ECR 329: „Although the Disciplinary Board only con- 
stitutes an advisory body of the appointing authority, it is bound... to observe the fundamental principles o f the law 
procedure” .
31 Case 85/76 Hoffman-La-Roche & Co AG v EC Commission ] 1979] ECR 461. Case 40/85 Kingdom of
Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2321. par. 2 8 : .... observance o f the right to be heard is, in all proceedings
initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental 
principle o f Community law”.
32 Decision no. 76-70, 12 February 1972, Rec. P. 39.
33 Decision no. 77-83, 20 July 1977, Rec. P. 29.
Court of Justice has stated that „the Commission of the EEC... cannot, however, be 
classed as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the...Convention”34. Clear- 
ly, there are differences in interpretation between the Community jurisdiction and 
the Convention, given the different objects of the two legał orders.
3. The protection of legitimate expectations is not described as a fundamental right 
by the Court of Justice: the principle is not found in the European Convention on 
Human Rights and is not always given the same recognition in the domestic laws 
of the various Member States. A component part of the generał principle of legał 
certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations has to do with whether or not 
the Citizen (or the Member States) can rely on a rule which is advantageous to him 
being maintained. The question has arisen in cases conceming the withdrawal of 
administrative measures35. Where a situation has been created unlawfully the prin­
ciple of legitimate expectations may come up against the fundamental principle of 
lawfulness. While it may be compared with the principle of good face or the rule of 
estoppel in the international order, the national sources of the principle are most 
difficult to discern.
Once again, German law provided the principal reference. Like the princi­
ple of proportionality, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations forms 
part of the concept of a State governed by law. Its recognition by the administrative 
courts (revocation and withdrawal of acts, retroactivity of norms) led the German 
Constitutional Court, on the basis of an interpretation of Article 20 of the Basic 
law, to confer constitutional value on the principle in a judgement delivered on 2 
February 197836.
In comparative European law there are more or less analogous methods of 
reasoning: the protection of legitimate expectations by the English courts does not 
amount to a generał principle -  the same applies in Ireland and in Denmark -  while 
the Netherlands courts use a series of criteria to assess the legitimacy of the confi- 
dence realated by the public authorities. Until recently French law did not recogni- 
se the protection of legitimate expectations as a generał principle37. However, Ar- 
ticles L80 A and L80 B of the Fiscal Procedures Book (the former is also found in 
the General Tax Code) allow a taxpayer, in certain conditions, to rely on an error in 
law based on a legitimate belief in the event of a change in doctrine by the tax au­
thorities. In other cases outside the field of taxation the administration is liable 
where a competent official under an obligation to provide information has given 
inaccurate or incomplete data that individual concemed has behaved prudently and
M FEDF.TAB agreements:Joined Cases 209-215 and 218/78 Heinz van Landdewyck Sari v EC Commis­
sion [1980] ECR 3125.
35 Joined Cases 7/56 and 3-7/57 Algera v Common Assembly [ 1957-58] ECR 39: „...The need to safegu- 
ard confidence in the stability o f the situation thus created...”.
36See the study by F. H u b e a u , Le principe de la confiance legitimate dtms la jurisprudence de la CJCE, 
„Cahiers de Droit Europeen" 1983, p. 143.
37 Cf. Infra, II.c.
reasonably. The same applies in the case of promises which are not kept, although 
an economic operator is always under a duty to act prudently38.
These prolegomena of a theory of legitimate expectations have their equ- 
ivalent in Community case-law: the protection of legitimate expectations cannot be 
relied on against a manifestly unlawful act or in favour of a situation susceptible of 
being altered or the object of which, for economic reasons, reąuires periodic ad- 
justments. None the less, the plea may be submitted in proceedings to have an act 
set aside and in proceedings to establish liability39.
IV. A functional limitation
1. The selection of fundamental rights, like the selection of the generał principles 
of which they form part, must be affected in a way that is fully compatible with the 
Community legał order. It is subject to the requirements of necessity and coheren- 
ce, „...within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community” 
(Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, cited above). That marks a fundamental diffe- 
rence from the practice of the Strasbourg organs, whose functions exclusively con- 
cem the definition and scope of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the State by 
the Convention. This means that the Court quite naturally applies the generał prin­
ciples and fundamental rights which follow directly from the wording of the tre­
aties and thus removes the distinction between the substantive rules of law and the 
principles of Community law. The same applies to the principles and fundamental 
rights which follow from the specific naturę of the Community. In this sphere the 
Court may find it necessary to decide between conflicting principles; thus it held 
that the principle of solidarity in the Community prevailed over the principle of 
proportionality and the right of property relied on by undertakings which sought 
protection on their commercial interests40.
The recognition of a generał principle or a common fundamental right is 
not sufficient to ensure that it is included in the Community legał order: it may 
only be included if it is not contradicted. Likewise, rights based on common con­
stitutional traditions or inspired by the European Convention on Human Rights (or 
other conventions on human rights) are subject to certain limits, which the Court 
defined in Nold  (cited above). This leading judgement was upheld in subsequent 
decisions concerning property41, freedom to follow an occupation42 or the right for
38 Council o f State 24 April 1964, Societe des Huileries de Chauny, Rec. P. 245, submissions o f G. Bra-
ibant.
39 The plea is frequently submitted by State in proceedings to have a decision set aside. That was so in 
one o f the first Spanish cases before the Couit, case 203/86 Spain v Council [1988] ECR 4563, cited by J. C. 
G a u tro n ,  L'insertion de l ’Espagne dans les mecanismes ilu contentieux communautaire in D ix anns de democra- 
tie constituionnelle en Espagne, ed. du CNRS 1991.
40 Case 254/78 Valsabbia v Commission [1980] ECR 907.
41 Case C-44/89 Georg von Deetzen [1991] ECR 1-5119.
42 Case 265/87 H. Schrader [1989| ECR 1-2263.
private life43. These limitations are therefore less narrow than the derogations ad- 
mitted by the Strasbourg organs.
2. A further major difference from the case-law of the origins of the European 
Convention on Human Rights is that the member States are required to recognise 
and to guarantee individual fundamental rights within the operative scope of the 
Treaty, or only where the act of the State in connected with Community law. When 
the Court of Justice examined a prohibition on residence from the aspect of the 
principle of freedom of movement for workers laid down in Article 48 of the EEC 
Treaty („subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy” (Article 48(3), 
it held that the „limitations placed on the powers of member States in respect of 
control of aliens [other than those in Directive 64/221] are a specific manifestation 
of the more generał principle, enshrined in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Conven- 
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms... and in Ar­
ticle 2 of Protocol No. 4 of the Convention..., which provide, in identical terms, 
that no restrictions in the interests of national security or public safety shall be pla­
ced on the rights secured by the above-quoted articles other than such as are neces- 
sary for the protection of those interests ‘in a democratic society”44. More explici- 
tly, Advocate General Trabucchi indicated in his Opinion in Watson and Bel- 
mann45, a case which concerned expulsion for failure to comply with certain admi- 
nistrative formalities, that: „the protection of the rights of man accordingly forms 
part of the Community system, even as against the States, inasmuch as the funda­
mental right relied upon involves a relationship or a legał situation the regulation of 
which is among the specific objects of the Treaty”.
The Court took up the matter again in Wachauf46. It ruled that national re- 
gulations adopted for the purpose of implementing Community law must respect 
fundamental rights. The limits of the obligation were defined a contrario in a num- 
ber of judgements: in Cinetheąue47 the Court observed that „although it is true that 
it is the duty of this Court to ensure observance of fundamental rights in the field of 
Community law, it has no power to examine the compatibility with the European 
Convention of national legislation which concerns, in this case, an area which falls 
within the jurisdiction of the national system”. However, in that case the Advocate 
General had suggested that restrictions on the free movement of goods based on the 
exceptions in Article 36 or mandatory requirements should be constructed in the 
light of the Convention. As Joel Rideau maintains48, the Cinetheąue decision could 
be distinguished from the Rutili decision by its suject-matter (the free movement of 
goods rather than freedom of movement for persons).
43 Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR 1-2575.
44 Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister for the Interior [ 1975] ECR 1219.
45 Case U  8/75 Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185.
46 Case 5/88 W achauf [1989] ECR 2609.
47 Joined cases 60/84 and 61/84 Cinetheąue S.A. v Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais [1985] 
ECR 2605.
48 J. R i d e a u, Droit institutionnel de 1'Union et des Commaunautes europeennes, LGDF 1995, p. 132.
As F. Mancini and V. di Bucchi emphesise49, the Court wished to avoid 
competition with the organs responsible for supervising the Convention and to 
preclude any control existing beyond cases where Community law was applica- 
ble50. However, on a reference from a national court for a preliminary ruling, the 
Court of Justice may find it appropriate to provide the national court with the po- 
ints which will enable it to determine whether national legislation is compatible 
with the European Convention „provided that the legislation falls within the scope 
of Community law”. Furthermore, the scope of the Court’s control has been exten- 
ded to national measures which derogate from Community law: „In particular, 
where a Member State relies on the combined provision& of Articles 56 and 66 in 
order to justify rules which are likely to obstruct the exercise of the freedom to 
provide services, such justification, provided for by Community law, must be in- 
terpreted in the light of the generał principles of law and in particular of fudamental 
rights. Thus the national rules in question can fali under the exceptions provided 
for by the combined provisions of Article 56 and 66 only if they are compatible 
with the fundamental rights the observance of which is ensured by the Court”51. 
Thus the limitation is a strictly but fully operational one.
3. Fudamental rights are subject to limits „justified by the generał objectives pursu- 
ed by the Community, so long as the substance of the right is not impaired” (Nold, 
citied above). In that regard, the Court is guided by the limits in the constitutional 
order of the States, sińce the right of property and the freedom to follow an ocupa- 
tion are not „absolute prerogatives” and include „limitations relating to the public 
interest”. A number of constitutions refer to its social use. Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1 to the European Convention includes a reference to restrictions in the „generał 
interest”, while as regards the majority of conditional rights the Convention provi- 
des for a generał public interest clause which allows statutory restrictions to be 
imposed in the public interest on condition that they are necessary in a democratic 
society.
V. Individual fundamental rights, an indication of the common European 
heritage
The relationship between individual fundamental rights and the common Euro­
pean heritage is dialectical in naturę, as is Community law itself. The Community 
legał order has fed on conceptions and rules that are prevalent in the member States 
ever sińce the stage when the Treaties were drawn up. It is for the Community in- 
stitutions gradually to adopt common rules which are established directly in the 
internal order of the Member States or transposed by those states in accordance
49 Ibidem.
S0Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadl Schwabisch Gmund 11987] ECR 3719: „[the C ourt| has no power to exa- 
mine the compatibily with the European Convention.. of national legislation lying outside the scope of Community 
law”.
51 Case C-260/90 ERT [19911 ECR 1-2925.
with the procedure applicable or the particular features of their legislative systems. 
In that sense Community law may be perceived as a permanent mechanism of 
structural adjustment follow which a common European right tends to emerge. It is 
elear that many other factors play a part and that Community legislation and case- 
law go hand in hand with changes, which are also brought about by technology, 
ethics, culture and the internationalisation of the economy, and provoke adaptations 
and changes in the domestic legał orders52. What happens is that Community legi­
slation and case-law reveal them, accelerate them and give form to them in the 
field to which they apply. Although that very generał approach may be applied to 
the rules on competition, the rules goveming the civil service, public markets or, 
for example, the rules governing the liability of the public powers, the ąuestion 
also arises in connection with individual fundamental rights.
A. from comparatiye law to Community law
The concept of „constitutional traditions common to the Member States”, which 
was established by the Court of Justice and reproduced word for word in Article F 
(2) of the Treaty on European Union, is obviously not completely elear. It is less 
precise that the reference, also made by the Court in the leading judgments cited 
above, to the „fundamental rights recognised and guaranteed by the constitutions of 
the Member States” . It is possible to see practical reasons in this semantic division. 
First, although the reference to constitutional traditions has a less precise meaning 
then the reference to fundamental rights, it allows the Court to go beyond the cate- 
gories of fundamental rights in the domestic legał systems, where they exist, and to 
avoid certain purely domestic divisions connected with the distinction between 
intangible fundamental rights and those subject to review, or to the distinction be­
tween rights that can be directly relied on in the domestic order and those which 
need to be implemented by legislation. It may be that the Court also did so because 
certain rights are not rigorously set out in the constitutional texts although they 
have constitutional value (where the courts have so declared) or constitutional sco- 
pe. Secondly, as Guy Isaac states53, the Court endeavours to identify a „maximum 
standard, that is to ensure that the highest national guarantee is applied at Commu­
nity level” . That openly progresive approach allows the Court to dispense with 
seeking a common denominator which might be nothing more than the expression 
of the lowest common denominator, which would run contrary to the search for the 
level that is most advantageous to the beneficiaries (a permanent principle in hu­
man right matters) and might lead to objections from the courts in States where the 
system of defining and protecting fundamental rights more advanced. Moreover, as 
M. Dauses observes54, the case-law of the Court of Justice may also include the 
generał principles of administrative law and judicial law, which are very similar to 
fund rights such as the principle of legał certainty, the protection of legitimate
52 O f particular interest is analysis by M. D e lm a s -M a r ty ,  in particular the pages which she devotes to 
the European laboratory, p. 223 et seq. (In Pour un droit commun, ed. du Seuil 1994)
53 G. I s a a c, Droit communautaire, generał Masson, Fourth Edition, p. 155.
54 M. D a u s e s ,  La protection des droits Fondamentaus dans l ’ordre juridique communautaire, Re. Trim 
de droit de droit europeen , 1984, no, 3, p. 407.
expectations or proportionality, in view of the constant overlaping of generał prin­
ciples and fundamental rights55. There is no strictly positivist definition of „con­
stitutional traditions” in European comparative law.
Similarly, the „common” naturę of fundamental rights must be given a 
flexible interpretation, sińce, as the Community periodically grows larger, the con- 
cept of jus communis may constantly be called in question. In his Opinion in Zuc- 
kerfabrik, a case concerning the second paragraph of Article 215 of EEC Treaty, 
Advocate Roemer observed that a principe might be declared a common principle 
provided that it was „widely recognised”, without there being any need for the 
Court to determine to what precise arthetical extent it was „common”. It will be 
recalled that the extra-contractual liability of the Community, despite the wording 
of the second paragraph of Article 215, was established autonomously following 
what F. Fines calls a „fruitless comparative study”56. Although one of the applica- 
tions to attract most attention as regards the right of property and the free exercise 
of trade, work and other occupational activities was the application in Nold, it 
should be observed that in that case the Court referred both to the common consti­
tutional traditions and to the international treaties on the protection of Human ri­
ghts. In Hauer57 the Court also referred to the constitutional rights recognised in 
the Member States and to the European Convention.
In Johnson, a leading cas on the right to obtain a judicial determination, 
following an action based on the infringement of a Council directive of 9 February 
on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, including promotion and vocational training, the 
Court ruled that the right to obtain an effective judicial remedy before the national 
court followed from the generał wording of the directive, especially Article 6, but 
that, more broadly, it reflected „a generał principle of law which underlines the 
constitutional traditions common to the member states”; the Court went to state that 
[it[ „also laid down in ... theEuropean Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. In refering to both domestic sources and an 
international source the Court appears to show a preference for a single document 
containing clearly expressed provisions. Is it therefore possible to speak of a very 
clearly decline in the reference to „common constitutional traditions”?
B. From Convention law to Community law
The above-mentioned uncertainties regarding the reference to the „common con­
stitutional traditions” induced the Court, from 1974, to take account of the funda­
mental rights in certain articles of the European Convention. As it was said before, 
this new approach has the advantage for the judge of making a comp.'rative rese- 
arch, which may prove uncertain, unnecessary. One of the main rules of the law on 
„human rights” is that the highest norm must benefit the individual and therefore 
prevail in every case. The Court of Justice decided along those lines in Opinion 
2/91 on the compatibility with thw Treaty of Convention No 170 of the Internatio-
55Cf. Suora, I .B .
56F. F in e s ,  op. cit., p.I07.
57Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727.
nal Labour Organisation58. Paragraph 18 deserves to be cited in fuli: „For the pur- 
pose of determining whether this competence is exclusive in naturę, it should be 
pointed out that the provisions of Convention No 170 are not of such a kind as to 
affect rules adopted pursuant to Article 118a. If, on the other hand, the Community 
decides to adopt rules which are less stringent than those set out in an ILO conven- 
tion, Member States may, in accordance with Article 118a(3), adopt more stringent 
mesures for the protection of working conditions or apply for that purpose the 
provisions of the relevant ILO convention. If, on the other hand, the Community 
decides to adopt more stringent measures that those provided for under an ILO 
convention, there is nothing to prevent the fuli application of the Community law 
by the Member States under Article 19(8) of the ILO Constitution, which allows 
members to adopt more stringent measures that those provided for in conventions 
or recommendations adopted by that organisation”.
Apart from the above-mentioned imperfections in the „character common” to 
tthe member States, the search for the highest norm may lead do contradictory 
appreciations or discrepancies. The advantage of recourse to the European 
Convention arise from the unity of the norm throughout the European area because 
it is accepted in the same way by all Member States. As regards their authority in 
the Community internal legał order, fundamental rights have the same authority as 
the principles and are therefore superior to secondary Community legislation and to 
national measures adopted to implement Community law. In application of their 
incorporation in Comunity law, the Court makes elear that once the principle is 
accepted there is no further need to refer to the source, be it domestic or internatio­
nal.
1. The place of the rules set out in the European Convention as regards Community 
law is rather special, sińce they have not been incorporated into Comunity law. 
Although the Court of Justice considers that: „The international treaties on the 
protection of human rights in which the member States have cooperated or to 
which they have adhered can also supply indications which may be taken into ac- 
count within the framework of Community law” the Community is not bound by 
the rules of the Convention. None the less, a number of writers had suggested that 
the Community might be bound by the Convention, on the model of the Gatt59, 
provided that all the States had adhered to it. The Court’s position has not changed 
and is consistent with the position adopted by the European Commission of Human 
Rights, which does not accept the admissibility of an application against a Com­
munity measures (CFDT v European Communities, decision of 10 July 1978) but 
may accept the admissibility of an action against a national measure that imple- 
ments Community law (Procola v Luxembourg, decision of 1 July 1993) This deci­
sion goes some way towards correcting the interpretation which had been given of 
the M. and Co. Decision of 9 February 1990. Where the Commission declared in-
58Opinion C-2/91 [1993] ECR 1-1061.
59 Joined Case 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company 11972) ECR 1219.
admissible ratione materiae an application against a measure implementing a jud­
gement of the Court of Justice (and not a Community measure)60.
The somewhat unclear scope of the Convention in the Community machi- 
nery for the establishment of individual fundamental rights raises a number of qu- 
estions:
- may Article 6 of the Convention, and therefore the right to a fair hearing, be 
invoked against a judicial decision refusing to refer a matter to the Court of Justice 
for a preliminary ruling?61
sińce the Court of Justice of the European Communities is not bound by the 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, differences in interpretation 
may arise, the risk of this being increased by the specific features of the Com­
munity legał order. It is common knowledge that in Hoechst the Court of Justi­
ce held that the right to respect for the home laid down in Article 8 of the 
Convention did not extend to business premises, contrary to the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights62. In one situation, in order to prevent possi- 
ble differences in interpretation, the Court of Justice preferred to wait until the 
European Court of Human Rights had decided the matter. The case is well 
known: it concerned the appraisal, from the aspect of Article 10 of the 
Convention (on freedom of expression and freedom to receive and impart in- 
formation), of the prohibition in Irland on the distribution of information on 
clinics performing abortions abroad63. On a reference for a preliminary ruling, 
the Court took the view that although abortion might be decided as a service, 
the activity of students associations which distributed the information was not 
economic in naturę and, accordingly, sińce the prohibition of that activity in 
Irland did not constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide service within 
the meaning of Article 59 of the EEC Treaty, the Court was not empowered to 
compare it with the fundamental rights deriving from the European Convention 
on Human Rights64. That case illustrates the differences of the functional limi- 
tation mentioned above and also the risk of conflicting decisions. We know 
that the European Court of Human Rights considered that the relevant Irish 
domestic law in breach of the principle of the freedom to receive and impart in­
formation and thus violated Article 10 of the Convention.
Two solutions, possibly cumulative, have envisaged in order to ensure that the 
European Convention on Human Rights and, more broadly, fundamental rights are 
more fully respected in the Community: the so-called „catalogue of fundamental 
rights”, which the European Parliament decided to reject in 1973 but to which it
60 J. P. J a c q u e ,  Comimimutłe europeenne et Convention eiiropeenne des droits de l'hom m e in La 
Comention europeenne... Commentaire article par article, „Economica” 1993.
61 G. C o h e n - J o n a th a n  and J. P. J a c q u e ,  Activites de ta Commission europeenne des droits de 
l'homme, AFDI 1989, p. 514 et seq. The uuthors draw a comparison with the reasoning o f the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in Solange II.
62 Case 46/87 Hoechest |1989 | ECR 2589.
63 Case C -159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v Grogan [ 19911 ECR 1-4685.
64 Cf. L. I d o t, A propos de I 'interntption volonutire de ,i'rossess: prem ier bilan de la jurisprttdence de la 
Cour relative a la librę prestation de service in 1991, „Europę” 1991. no. 1 (November), chronique p. 4.
retumed when the Treaty on European Union was being drafted, or accession by 
the Community to the European Convention on Human Rights. Since the project of 
a catalogue of fundamental rights caused ąuestions to be asked (difficult negotia- 
tions between States, the risk of incompleteness or duplication, inappropriateness 
to the structure and mode of operation of the Community)65, that left the prospect 
of accession to the Convention. That approach had received the enthusiastic 
supported of the Commission and the European Parliament in 1979 and was again 
taken up by the Parliament when the Treaty on European Union wa being drafted.
The accession rute was provisionally close by Opinion 2/94 delivered by 
the Court of 28 March 1996 following a reąuest to the Court from the Council of 
the European Union under Article 228(6) Of the EEC Treaty. The admissibility of 
the request for an opinion, in the absence of an agreement framed in sufficiently 
precise terms, led the Member States to adopt opposing positions. The Court chose 
to examine the admissibility of the reąuest solely from the point of view of the 
competence of the Community and from that of its substance, i.e. the compatibility 
of accession to the Convention with the provisions of the EEC Treaty, in particular 
with Articles 164 and 219 on the competence of the Court of Justice66. In reliance 
on the principle laid down in Article 3B that the Community only has those powers 
which have been conferred on it, which may possible to widened by the use of 
implied powers, the Court states that no provision conferred on the Community 
institutions any generał power to enact rules on human rights or to conclude inter­
national conventions in this field and that Article 235 did not provide sufficient 
basis for changing the Treaty to such an extend. Accession could be brought about 
only by way of amendment of the Treaties prior to the integration of the European 
Convention in the Community legał order. As Professor Denys Simon points out, 
the Opinion of the Court has the effect of placing human rights in a classic system 
in which powers are allocated by area instead of making them, in accordance with 
its established case-law, into a horizontal principle which would underlie all the 
activities of the Community67. It is true that in the absence of a specific proposal 
accession would have meant legał change, in particular as regards the judicial ar- 
chitecture of the system, as Opinion 1/91 stated more forcefully. In Opinion 2/94 
the Court recalled the classic position of the Community regarding fudamental 
rights.
2. The scope of the rules of the European Convention on Human Rights as regards 
the common European heritage may be evaluated in a number of ways. First, the 
Court of Human Rights describes the Convention as a „constitutional instrument of 
European public order ( ‘odre public)" (the Loizidou v Turkey judgment of 24 
March 1995, Series A no. 310). While it is true that the concept of public order is 
difficult to define, it is generally seen by writers as the expression of values com-
65 Cf. Ch. P h i l ip ,  La Cour de Justice des Communautes europeennes et la protection des droits fonda- 
mentaux dans L 'ordre juridiąue communautaire, AFD1 1975, especially p. 405.
66 Article 165: „The Court o f Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application o f this Treaty 
the law is observed”.
67D .S im o n , „Europę” 1996, no. 6 (June), chronique 6, p. 1.
mon to a society and in the case of the Convention, a society made up of several 
national societies. Analysing these common values, F. Sudre emphasises the con- 
cept derived by the European Court of Human Rights of principles peculiar to a 
democratic society and the objective function of fundamental rights which are de- 
signed not only to protect the individual but also to guide the organs of the State, 
and indeed to help establish the intemal structure of the States68. The structuring 
function of the Convention is plain where the institutional effects of the right to a 
fair hearing are concerned (independence and functioning of the courts, means of 
access to judicial control). In spite of the rarity of State applications, the collective 
guarantee remains one of the fundamental principles of European public order, 
while the Commission’s power to bring matters before the European Court and the 
long-term development of the individual petition (Protocol No. 9 and Protocol No. 
11) operate in the same sense.
A second approach consists in comparing the rights protected in the system 
of the European Convention with the rights guaranteed by constitutional norms (the 
theory of parallelism). A third factor must be taken into consideration, namely the 
influence exerted by the European Convention on Human Rights on constitutional 
courts and administrative courts through the authority on the decisions delivered by 
the Strasbourg Court. In a study of the French administrative courts. Joel Andriant- 
simbazovina69 has endavoured to identify three forms of authority of that case-law: 
binding authority (autorite de la chose jugee)', what he describes as „persuasive” 
authority: and authority deriving from interpretation (autorite de chose interprete- 
e), which is impregnated with the concepts in force in the Community order but 
difficult to implement in the case of the Convention unless there is some provision 
for dialogue between the judges.The Constitutional Courts have also borrowed 
from the techniąues of interpretation used by the European Court of Human Rights 
in order to ensure the effective protection of fundamental rights or to order the 
legislature to exercise its power.
3. The capacity of the Court of Justice to be guided by the rules of the European 
Convention on Human Rights70 has the advantage of erasing the differences caused 
by the differences in the status of the Convention in the various national legał or­
ders (it may have been incorporated in the national legał order, or be directly appli- 
cable, or have primacy), which might increase even further with the enlargement of 
the Council of Europę and the corresponding growth in the number o f Parties to the 
Convention. In the field of Community law raising the rules of the Convention in 
the status of generał principles of the Community legał order confers an additional
68 F. S u d re , Existe-t-il un ordre public europeen? In Quelle Europę pour les droits de riiomme?, Brus- 
sels 1996, p. 39 et seq.
69 J. A n d r i a n t s im b a z o v in a ,  L 'autorite des decisions de justice constitutionnelles et europeennes sur 
le juge  administratifframcais, Bordeaux 1994.
70 The principles which the Court of Justice has borrowed from the Convention, apart from the right of 
ownership and the freedom to exercise professional activities (cited above) concern the inviolability o f the home, 
the non-retroactivity o f criminal provisions, the right to a court, the protection of the name and human dignity, the 
right to a fair hearing, respect for religious belief, the rights o f the defence and freedom of expression, i.e.a collec- 
tion o f rights which constitue the common European herritage.
degree of authority on them. As regards their application by the courts, the Court of 
Justice has an extensive role because of the preliminary ruling procedure, which 
establishes a direct relationship with the national courts. Furthermore, seen from 
the aspect of the common heritage, the Court of Justice, because its composition, 
tends to erase the distinction between the romano-germanic system (which is prin- 
cipally based on binding authority) and the common law system (which emphasises 
precedent and thus to a large extent the authority of interpretation), and thus brings 
together binding authority and authority deriving from interpretation71. The funda­
mental issue is undoubtedly the tradition in the Continental countries does nor reco- 
gnise that case-law has a normative role: this is the source of a certain concern as 
regards the case-law of the Court of Justice in generał, and in the area of funda­
mental rights in particular.
C. Community law and law common to Europę
The fundamental rights established by the Court of Justice are therefore situated at 
the pivot of three legał orders: the national (constitutional) legał order, the order 
deriving from the European Convention and the Community legał order. As it was 
mentioned before, the consequence is a paradigm of complexity that is not ready to 
fade away, in some way a provisionał status, perfectly illustrated by the conditio- 
nality in the Solange II judgement or in the M. and Co. v FGR decision of the Eu­
ropean Commission of Human Rights, the common inspiration of which has been 
emphasised. In order to reduce the risk of divergence, a number of writers have 
suggested that the Court of Justice might refer a question to the European Court of 
Human Rights for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Convention. 
That suggestion is not compatible with the current state of the law, sińce Commu­
nity may be guided by the Convention but is not bound by it72. It would be illusory 
to imagine that an agreement on accession to the Convention (should the Treaties 
be amended) or an agreement on cooperation could put the Court of Justice in a 
position where it could make use of a mechanism not available to courts of the 
Member States.
The formation of a common body of law in Europę thus encounters both 
procedural and substantive difficulties which are very characteristic of the political 
structure of continent. Federal solutions have been simpler. In 1925 the Supreme 
Court of the United States, in Gitlow v New York, extended the scope of the Bill of 
Rights to the legislative and administrative measures of the federal states, whereas 
it previously concerned only the federal authorities. In Canada the Constitution of 
1867, and then more recently the Charter of 1982, established the status of citi- 
zenship consisting of political rights and a few fundamental rights73. However,
71 Cf. J. A n d r i a n t s i  m b a z o v in a ,  op. cii. p. 893. The writer cites the grounds o f Kruslin judgement of
24 April 1990 delivered by the the European Court of Human Rights: „In a sphere covered by the written law, the 
‘law’ is the enactmenin force as the competent courts have interpreted it”.
72 A number o f  Governments suggested a similar arrangement wlien llie rec|ucst for an opinion on the ac­
cession of the Community to the Convention was being considered; questions for a preliminary ruling might be 
...in order to maintain the autonomy of the Community legał order.
73 Article 8A of the Treaty on European Union establishes the right to move and reside frccly within the 
territory o f the Member States as one o f the rights o f European citizenship. This is a fundamental right which
while the European Convention has had a countable influence on the fundamental 
rights recognised and guaranteed in the Member States, the influence of the fun­
damental rights of the Community legał order cannot be ignored. In different cir- 
cumstances the theory of the fundamental rights of the Community legał order also 
exercises two influences: a direct influence, sińce the Member States are reąuired 
to respect them when they apply or implement Community law; and an indirect 
influence in so far as the sołutions applied are susceptible of influencing the sphere 
of the extra-Community legislative or administrative activities of the States (the 
contagion effect)74. The latter effect has paradoxical links with the naturę of the 
Community. As a common public power (G. Isaak), the Community, despite the 
change of initials in 1992, has as its principal mission to regulate economic situ- 
ations. According to the European historical tradition, rights proclaimed have pri- 
marily concerned the person in globo, his rights in political life or in judicial life. It 
is interesting to note, therefore, that Community law is pressing for the application 
in economic flelds of concepts which were not initially envisaged from the econo­
mic point of view. That explains the inevitable promotion of the rights of underta- 
kings, which are legał persons. Although its bases are subtle, the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities reflects the main tendencies of this 
common European herritage, which is itself in a state of permanent change.
Community nationals enjoy even it' they do nol come within the specific provisions o f  Article 48. 52 and 59 o f  the 
EEC Treaty.
74 J. W c i I e r, The European Court at a Crossroads; Human Rights and M ember State Action in Liber 
amicorum Pierre Pescatore, Kraków 1987, p. 821 et seq.
